Chullin 33a

מי מצטרף סימן ראשון לסימן שני לטהרה מידי נבלה או לא The Gemara clarifies this dilemma: Does the first siman join together with the second siman to purify the animal from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass or not? In both cases the dilemma is: Does the cutting of the first siman, which serves the dual purpose of being a component of permitting consumption and preventing impurity of the animal, join together with the cutting of the second siman, which serves only the purpose of preventing impurity, in order to constitute a single act of slaughter and thereby prevent the animal from assuming the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass? Or perhaps because the cutting of each siman is performed for a different purpose they do not join together?

עד כאן לא איבעיא לן אלא לטהרה מידי נבלה אבל באכילה אסורה In any event, we raise the dilemma only in order to purify the foreleg from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass. But with regard to eating the slaughtered animal, all agree that it is forbidden, as even Rabbi Zeira concedes that the animal is a tereifa and retracts his objection to the distinction that Rava proposed between the lungs and the innards.

א"ל רב אחא בר רב לרבינא דלמא לעולם לא הדר ביה ור' זירא לדבריו דרבא קאמר וליה לא סבירא ליה Rav Aḥa bar Rav said to Ravina: Perhaps Rabbi Zeira actually did not retract his opinion, as even initially he held that there is no distinction between lungs and innards. If either is perforated after one siman was cut, the animal is a tereifa. And Rabbi Zeira stated his objection to the distinction of Rava in accordance with the statement of Rava, but he himself does not hold accordingly.

אמר רב אחא בר יעקב שמע מינה מדר' שמעון בן לקיש מזמנין ישראל על בני מעיים ואין מזמנין עובדי כוכבים על בני מעיים The Gemara continues its analysis of the statement of Reish Lakish, who said that after the windpipe is cut, the lung is considered as though it was placed in a basket, and if it is perforated before the slaughter is completed, the animal does not become a tereifa. Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov said: Learn from the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish that one may invite Jews to eat the innards of an animal that was slaughtered, but one may not invite gentiles to eat the innards of an animal that was slaughtered, because they are forbidden to gentiles.

מאי טעמא ישראל דבשחיטה תליא מילתא כיון דאיכא שחיטה מעלייתא אישתרי להו עובדי כוכבים דבנחירה סגי להו ובמיתה תליא מילתא הני כאבר מן החי דמו What is the reason? For Jews the matter of rendering the meat of the animal fit for consumption is dependent upon the performance of a valid act of slaughter. Once there is full-fledged slaughter and both simanim are cut, the innards are permitted to them even if the animal is convulsing. But with regard to gentiles, for whom stabbing is sufficient and slaughter is not required, the innards are permitted only after the animal is completely dead, since the matter of rendering the meat of the animal fit for consumption is dependent upon its death. Therefore, if the animal is still convulsing, these innards, which are considered to be outside the body after the cutting of the two simanim, are considered like a limb from a living animal and it is forbidden for gentiles to eat them.

אמר רב פפא הוה יתיבנא קמיה דרב אחא בר יעקב ובעי דאימא ליה מי איכא מידי דלישראל שרי ולעובד כוכבים אסור ולא אמרי ליה דאמינא הא טעמא קאמר Rav Pappa said: I was sitting before Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov and I sought to say to him that his statement is difficult: Is there anything that is permitted for a Jew but prohibited for a gentile? But I did not say that to him, as I said to myself: Didn’t he say a reason for his ruling? Therefore, there is no reason to ask the question.

תניא דלא כרב אחא בר יעקב הרוצה לאכול מבהמה קודם שתצא נפשה חותך כזית בשר מבית השחיטה ומולחו יפה יפה ומדיחו יפה יפה וממתין לה עד שתצא נפשה ואוכלו אחד עובד כוכבים ואחד ישראל מותרין בו The Gemara notes: It is taught in a baraita not in accordance with the opinion of Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov: One who seeks to eat from the meat of an animal before its soul departs may cut an olive-bulk of meat from the area of the slaughter, the neck, and salt it very well, i.e., more than is normally required, and rinse it very well in water to remove the salt and the blood, and wait until the animal’s soul departs, and eat it. It is permitted for both a gentile and a Jew to eat it. Contrary to the statement of Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov, there is no distinction between Jew and gentile.

מסייע ליה לרב אידי בר אבין דאמר רב אידי בר אבין אמר ר' יצחק בר אשיאן הרוצה שיבריא חותך כזית בשר מבית שחיטתה של בהמה ומולחו יפה יפה ומדיחו יפה יפה וממתין לה עד שתצא נפשה אחד עובד כוכבים ואחד ישראל מותרין בו: This baraita supports the statement of Rav Idi bar Avin, as Rav Idi bar Avin says that Rav Yitzḥak bar Ashyan says: One who seeks to recuperate from an illness should cut an olive-bulk of meat from the area of slaughter, i.e., the neck, of an animal, and salt it very well, and rinse it very well, and wait until the animal’s soul departs, and eat it. It is permitted for both a gentile and a Jew to eat it.

מתני׳ השוחט בהמה חיה ועוף ולא יצא מהן דם כשרים ונאכלין בידים מסואבות לפי שלא הוכשרו בדם ר' שמעון אומר הוכשרו בשחיטה: MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird, and blood did not emerge from them during the slaughter, all of these are permitted for consumption and do not require the ritual washing of the hands as they may be eaten with ritually impure [mesoavot] hands, because they were not rendered susceptible to ritual impurity through contact with blood, which is one of the seven liquids that render food susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Shimon says: They were rendered susceptible to ritual impurity by means of the slaughter itself.

גמ׳ טעמא דלא יצא מהן דם הא יצא מהן דם אין נאכלים בידים מסואבות אמאי ידים שניות הן ואין שני עושה שלישי בחולין GEMARA: The reason that they may be eaten with ritually impure hands is that blood did not emerge from the animals or birds during the slaughter; but if blood emerged from them during slaughter, they may not be eaten with ritually impure hands. The Gemara asks: Why not? Ordinary hands are impure with second-degree ritual impurity and an item of second-degree impurity cannot impart third-degree impurity to non-sacred items with which it comes into contact.

וממאי דבחולין עסקינן דקתני חיה דאילו קדשים חיה בקדשים מי איכא ותו אי בקדשים כי לא יצא מהן דם כשרה הוא עצמו לדם הוא צריך The Gemara clarifies: From where is it ascertained that we are dealing in the mishna with non-sacred food, and not with the slaughter of an offering? That is clear, as the tanna teaches in the list of those slaughtered: An undomesticated animal. As, if the tanna is referring to the slaughter of sacrificial animals and birds, is there any undomesticated animal included in the framework of sacrificial animals? And furthermore, if the tanna is referring to sacrificial animals, when no blood emerges from them are the offerings valid? The offering itself requires blood, as it is only through the presenting of the blood upon the altar that the offering is accepted.

ותו אי בקדשים כי יצא מהן דם מי מכשיר והאמר ר' חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן מנין לדם קדשים שאינו מכשיר שנאמר (דברים יב, טז) על הארץ תשפכנו כמים דם שנשפך כמים מכשיר שאינו נשפך כמים אינו מכשיר And furthermore, if the tanna is referring to sacrificial animals, when blood emerges from them, does it render them susceptible to ritual impurity? But doesn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: From where is it derived that the blood of sacrificial animals does not render food susceptible to ritual impurity? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “You shall not eat it; you shall pour it upon the earth like water” (Deuteronomy 12:24). Blood of a non-sacred animal, which is poured like water when it is slaughtered, renders food susceptible to ritual impurity. By contrast, blood of a sacrificial animal, which is not poured like water but is presented on the altar, does not render food susceptible to ritual impurity.

ותו אי בקדשים כי לא יצא מהם דם לא מתכשרי ליתכשרי בחיבת הקדש דקיי"ל חיבת הקדש מכשרתן And furthermore, if the tanna is referring to sacrificial animals, when blood does not emerge from them are they not nevertheless rendered susceptible to ritual impurity? Let them be rendered susceptible to ritual impurity by means of regard for sanctity, as we maintain that regard for sanctity renders food suceptible to ritual impurity even in the absence of contact with any of the seven liquids.

א"ר נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה הכא בחולין שלקחן בכסף מעשר עסקינן ודלא כר"מ דתנן Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: Here we are dealing with non-sacred food that one purchased in Jerusalem with second-tithe money, which assumes the status of the second-tithe produce. This produce, in turn, assumes third-degree impurity through contact with hands that have second-degree impurity. And this mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as we learned in a mishna (Para 11:5):

בחולין שנעשו על טהרת תרומה ורבי יהושע לא ס"ד דקתני בשר דאי בתרומה בשר מי איכא with regard to the case of non-sacred food items that were prepared on the level of purity of teruma and in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. The Gemara responds: It should not enter your mind that the mishna is referring to a case of the level of purity of teruma, as the mishna teaches a case of the slaughter of animals and birds and consumption of their meat. And if the mishna is taught with regard to non-sacred food items that were prepared on the level of purity of teruma, is there meat eaten with the level of purity of teruma? The practice of preparing non-sacred food items on the level of purity of teruma is done only so that one will not treat actual teruma in the correct manner, and teruma is separated only from produce that grows in the ground.

אלא מאי בקדשים חיה בקדשים מי איכא בשר בבשר מיחלף בשר בפירי לא מיחלף The Gemara asks: Rather, what is the case in the mishna? Is it a case of non-sacred food items that were prepared on the level of purity of sacrificial food? Is there an undomesticated animal that can be sacrificed as an offering and its meat is sacrificial food? The Gemara answers: Although undomesticated animals cannot be sacrificed as an offering, there are those who would undertake to eat their meat only when prepared on the level of purity of sacrificial food because meat of an undomesticated animal is sometimes interchanged with meat of a domesticated animal. No one would undertake to eat meat only when prepared on the level of purity of teruma, because meat would not be interchanged with produce.

אמר עולא חבריא אמרין בחולין שנעשו על טהרת הקדש ודלא כרבי יהושע Ulla said: My colleagues say that the mishna is referring to the case of non-sacred food items that were prepared on the level of purity of sacrificial food, and the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who says: Non-sacred food items that were prepared on the level of purity of teruma assume third-degree impurity, but non-sacred food items that were prepared on the level of purity of sacrificial food do not assume third-degree impurity.

ואנא אמינא רבי יהושע היא ולא מיבעיא קאמר לא מיבעיא חולין שנעשו על טהרת קדש דחמירי דאית בהו שלישי אלא אפילו חולין שנעשו על טהרת תרומה נמי אית בהו שלישי Ulla continues: And I say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, and when he said that non-sacred food items that were prepared on the level of purity of teruma assume third-degree impurity, he is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. It is not necessary to say that in the case of non-sacred food items that were prepared on the level of purity of sacrificial food, which is stringent, that they have the capacity of assuming third-degree impurity. Rather, even non-sacred food items that were prepared on the level of purity of teruma also have the capacity of assuming third-degree impurity.

מאן חבריא רבה בר בר חנה היא דאמר רבה בר בר חנה א"ר יוחנן מאי אהדרי רבי אליעזר ורבי יהושע להדדי The Gemara asks: Who are the colleagues to whom Ulla referred? It is Rabba bar bar Ḥana, as Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: What did Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua reply to each other? The differences between their opinions are twofold. First, Rabbi Eliezer holds that one who eats food with first-degree impurity assumes first-degree impurity, while according to Rabbi Yehoshua he assumes second-degree impurity. Second, Rabbi Eliezer holds that one who eats food with third-degree impurity assumes third-degree impurity, while according to Rabbi Yehoshua he assumes second-degree impurity vis-à-vis sacrificial food but not vis-à-vis teruma.

אמר לו ר"א לרבי יהושע מצינו אוכל חמור מן האוכל דאילו נבלת עוף טהור בחוץ לא מטמא ואילו אוכלה מטמא בגדים אבית הבליעה ואנו היאך לא נעשה אוכל כמאכל Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: The basis for my opinion that one assumes the level of impurity of that which he ate is that we found a case where the halakha of the one who eats a food item is more stringent than the halakha of the food itself. As, the carcass of a kosher bird on the outside, i.e., when one comes into contact with it, does not impart ritual impurity, while one who eats the carcass of the kosher bird renders his garments impure when the food is in his throat. And we, in light of that, how will we not deem one who eats the impure item to be on a level of impurity at least like that of the food that he ate?

ורבי יהושע מנבלת עוף טהור לא גמרינן דחידוש הוא אלא מצינו שהמאכל חמור מן האוכל דאילו מאכל בכביצה ואוכל עד דאכיל כחצי פרס ואנו היאך נעשה אוכל כמאכל And Rabbi Yehoshua responded that we do not derive other cases from the case of the carcass of a kosher bird, because it is a novel ruling that cannot serve as a paradigm. Rather, we found that the halakha of food is more stringent than the halakha of the one who eats it, as food becomes impure if its measure is that of an egg-bulk, and one who eats impure food does not become impure until he eats half of a half-loaf. And we, in light of that, how will we deem one who eats the impure item to be on a level of impurity like that of the food that he ate?

ור"א טומאה משיעורין לא גמרינן ועוד לדבריך שאתה אומר על ראשון שני יפה אתה אומר שני שני למה And Rabbi Eliezer responded: We do not derive the relative stringency of ritual impurity from the relative size of halakhic measures, as measures are not indicative of stringency or leniency. And furthermore, according to your statement, that which you say with regard to one who eats food with first-degree ritual impurity, that he assumes second-degree impurity, what you say is well. But that which you say with regard to one who eats food with second-degree impurity, that he assumes second-degree impurity, why is that the case? It contradicts your reasoning.

אמר לו מצינו שהשני עושה שני ע"י משקין Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: We found that food with second-degree impurity renders other food impure with second-degree impurity by means of liquids. Liquids that come into contact with food with second-degree impurity render other food with which they come into contact impure with second-degree impurity.

אמר לו והא משקין נמי תחלה הוו דתנן כל הפוסל בתרומה מטמא משקין להיות תחלה חוץ מטבול יום Rabbi Eliezer said to him: But aren’t those liquids also impure with first-degree ritual impurity through contact with an item impure with second-degree impurity? As we learned in a mishna (Para 8:7): Any item with second-degree ritual impurity that disqualifies teruma renders liquids impure with first-degree ritual impurity. These liquids assume a degree of impurity greater than that of the item that rendered them impure. This rabbinic decree applies to all people and items with second-degree impurity except for one who was ritually impure who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed. Liquids with which he comes into contact follow the standard course of transmitted impurity and assume third-degree impurity, one level below his own impurity.

ועוד שלישי שני למה Rabbi Eliezer questioned the next segment in the ruling of Rabbi Yehoshua: And furthermore, that which you say with regard to one who eats food with third-degree impurity, that he assumes second-degree impurity vis-à-vis sacrificial food, why is that the halakha? It contradicts your reasoning.

אמר לו אף אני לא אמרתי אלא בתרומה שטהרתה Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: I too stated that one who eats food with third-degree impurity assumes second-degree impurity vis-à-vis sacrificial food only with regard to one who eats non-sacred food items that were prepared on the level of purity of teruma, as its state of purity

טומאה היא אצל הקדש is impurity vis-à-vis sacrificial food. The Sages issued a decree that even one who is vigilant to partake of his teruma in a state of ritual purity is considered impure vis-à-vis one partaking of sacrificial food. Therefore, one who ate a food item that was prepared on the level of purity of teruma that had become impure with third-degree impurity assumes second-degree impurity, and he renders sacrificial food impure.

אמר רבי זירא א"ר אסי א"ר יוחנן א"ר ינאי האוכל שלישי של חולין שנעשו על טהרת הקדש נעשה גופו שני לקדש Rabbi Zeira says that Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that Rabbi Yannai says: With regard to one who eats non-sacred food items that were prepared on the level of purity of sacrificial food, and these items had become impure with third-degree impurity, his body becomes impure with second-degree impurity vis-à-vis sacrificial food. He renders sacrificial food with which he comes into contact impure with third-degree impurity, and that food in turn disqualifies sacrificial food with which it comes into contact.

איתיביה רבי זירא לרבי אסי שלישי שני לקדש ואין שני לתרומה בחולין שנעשו על טהרת תרומה על טהרת תרומה אין על טהרת הקדש לא Rabbi Zeira raised an objection to the statement of Rabbi Asi from the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua: One who eats food with third-degree impurity assumes second-degree impurity vis-à-vis sacrificial food but does not assume second-degree impurity vis-à-vis teruma. This is stated in the case of non-sacred food items that were prepared on the level of purity of teruma. The Gemara infers: Yes, one is able to prepare items on the level of purity of teruma, but one is not able to prepare items on the level of purity of sacrificial food, as in the latter case the non-sacred food does not become impure at all.

אמר ליה לא מיבעיא קאמר Rabbi Asi said to Rabbi Zeira: That inference is incorrect, as Rabbi Yehoshua is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. It is not necessary to say that in the case of non-sacred food items that were prepared on the level of purity of sacrificial food, which is stringent, they have the capacity of assuming third-degree impurity. Rabbi Yehoshua teaches that non-sacred food items that were prepared on the level of purity of teruma also have the capacity of assuming third-degree impurity.

והא אף אני לא אמרתי אלא בתרומה קאמר אמוראי נינהו ואליבא דרבי יוחנן The Gemara objects: But didn’t Rabbi Yehoshua say to Rabbi Eliezer according to the explanation that Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: I too stated this only with regard to non-sacred food items that were prepared on the level of purity of teruma, indicating that he was not referring to non-sacred food items that were prepared on the level of purity of sacrificial food. The Gemara explains: Rabba bar bar Ḥana and Rabbi Asi are amora’im, and disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and they disagree about whether the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua was stated specifically with regard to non-sacred food items that were prepared on the level of purity of teruma, or whether it includes even those prepared on the level of purity of sacrificial food.

אמר עולא האוכל שלישי של חולין שנעשו על טהרת תרומה נפסל גופו מלאכול בתרומה § Ulla says: One who eats non-sacred food items that were prepared on the level of purity of teruma and that are impure with third-degree impurity, his body is disqualified from the right to partake of teruma.

מאי קמ"ל תנינא שלישי שני לקדש ואין שני לתרומה בחולין שנעשו על טהרת תרומה שני הוא דלא הוי הא שלישי הוי The Gemara asks: What is Ulla teaching us? We already learn in the mishna cited earlier (33b) from tractate Teharot: One who eats food with third-degree impurity assumes second-degree impurity vis-à-vis sacrificial food, but does not assume second-degree impurity vis-à-vis teruma. This is stated in the case of non-sacred food items that were prepared on the level of purity of teruma. The Gemara infers: It is second-degree impurity that he does not assume, but third-degree impurity he assumes, and he is therefore disqualified from partaking of teruma.

אי מההיא הוה אמינא לא שני הוי ולא שלישי הוי ואיידי דאמר שני בקדש אמר נמי אין שני בתרומה קמ"ל The Gemara answers: It was necessary for Ulla to teach this halakha, as if it was learned from that mishna, I would say that vis-à-vis teruma he assumes neither second-degree nor third-degree impurity, as there is no reason to deem the status of one who eats like that of the food that he ate. And perhaps it was only since Rabbi Yehoshua said that he assumes second-degree impurity vis-à-vis sacrificial food that he also said that he does not assume second-degree impurity vis-à-vis teruma. Therefore, Ulla teaches us that he assumes third-degree impurity and is disqualified from partaking of teruma.

איתיביה רב המנונא לעולא הראשון שבחולין טמא ומטמא והשני פוסל ואינו מטמא והשלישי נאכל בנזיד הדמע Rav Hamnuna raised an objection to the statement of Ulla from a mishna (Teharot 2:3): Non-sacred food that is impure with first-degree impurity is impure and renders teruma impure in the sense that this teruma disqualifies other teruma with which it comes into contact. Non-sacred food that is impure with second-degree impurity disqualifies teruma, but it does not render teruma impure, meaning that it renders the teruma itself impure, but not to the extent that the teruma can render other teruma impure. And food that is impure with third-degree impurity may be eaten by a priest in a stew that is a mixture containing spices of teruma.

ואי אמרת נפסל גופו מלאכול בתרומה ספינן ליה מידי דפסיל ליה לגופיה אמר ליה הנח לנזיד הדמע And if you say that by partaking of food that is impure with third-degree impurity his body is disqualified from the right to partake of teruma, do we feed him a matter that invalidates his body from the right to partake of teruma? According to this, when eating the stew that contains food that is impure with third-degree impurity, he is disqualified from partaking of the spices of teruma that the mishna permits him to add to the stew. Ulla said to him: Leave the matter of stew that is a mixture containing spices of teruma,

דליכא כזית בכדי אכילת פרס as there is not an olive-bulk of teruma in the amount of stew that he eats in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread. Therefore, one need not treat the mixture with the level of purity required of teruma.

א"ר יונתן אמר רבי האוכל שלישי של תרומה עצמה אסור לאכול ומותר ליגע Rabbi Yonatan says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: For one who partakes of actual teruma that is impure with third-degree impurity, it is prohibited to partake of other teruma, but it is permitted to come into contact with teruma.

ואיצטריך דעולא ואיצטריך דרבי יונתן דאי מדעולא הוה אמינא הני מילי בחולין שנעשו על טהרת תרומה אבל תרומה בנגיעה נמי אסור איצטריך דרבי יונתן ואי מדרבי יונתן הוה אמינא הני מילי תרומה אבל חולין באכילה נמי שרי צריכי The Gemara notes that the statement of Ulla was necessary and the statement of Rabbi Yonatan was necessary. As, if the halakha were learned exclusively from the statement of Ulla, I would say: This statement applies with regard to non-sacred food items that were prepared on the level of purity of teruma, but with regard to teruma itself perhaps contact is also prohibited. Therefore, the statement of Rabbi Yonatan was necessary. And if the halakha were learned exclusively from the statement of Rabbi Yonatan, I would say: This statement applies with regard to teruma, but with regard to non-sacred food that was prepared with purity of teruma, perhaps eating it is also permitted. Therefore, both statements are necessary.

יתיב רב יצחק בר שמואל בר מרתא קמיה דר"נ ויתיב וקאמר האוכל שלישי של חולין שנעשו על טהרת הקדש טהור לאכול בקדש שאין לך דבר שעושה רביעי בקדש אלא קדש מקודש בלבד § Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta was sitting before Rav Naḥman, and he was sitting and saying: With regard to one who eats non-sacred food items that were prepared on the level of purity of sacrificial food, and these items had become impure with third-degree impurity, he is ritually pure in terms of the right to partake of sacrificial food, as you have nothing that confers fourth-degree impurity in sacrificial food other than consecrated sacrificial food alone, but non-sacred food prepared with the purity of sacrificial food does not.

מתיב רמי בר חמא שלישי שני לקדש ואין שני לתרומה בחולין שנעשו על טהרת תרומה אמאי הא לאו קדש מקודש הוא Rami bar Ḥama raises an objection from the mishna cited earlier (33b): One who eats food with third-degree impurity assumes second-degree impurity vis-à-vis sacrificial food, and he does not assume second-degree impurity vis-à-vis teruma. Eating an item with third-degree impurity is feasible only in the case of non-sacred items, as partaking of impure teruma is prohibited. It is only possible in the case of non-sacred food items that were prepared as if their level of purity were on the level of the purity of teruma. According to the statement of Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta, why does this food assume second-degree impurity? It is not sacrificial food, which is sanctified.

א"ל הנח לתרומה שטהרתה טומאה היא אצל הקדש Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta said to him: Leave teruma alone; its state of purity is impurity vis-à-vis sacrificial food. Therefore, non-sacred food that was prepared with the purity of teruma renders sacrificial food impure.

ומנא תימרא דתנן בגדי עם הארץ מדרס לפרושין בגדי פרושין מדרס לאוכלי תרומה בגדי אוכלי תרומה מדרס לקדש The Gemara asks: And from where do you say that the purity of teruma is impurity vis-à-vis sacrificial food? It is from a mishna (Ḥagiga 18b), as we learned: The halakhic status of the garments of an am ha’aretz, who does not scrupulously observe the halakhot of ritual purity, is like that of items rendered impure by treading, e.g., items designated for sitting or lying upon which a zav or a menstruating woman sits or lies, which are rendered a primary source of ritual impurity for individuals who scrupulously observe the halakhot of ritual purity [perushin] and eat their non-sacred food in a state of purity. In other words, it is considered a primary level of impurity for them. The halakhic status of the garments of perushin is like that of items rendered impure by treading for priests who partake of teruma. In addition, the halakhic status of the garments of priests who partake of teruma is like that of items rendered impure by treading for those who eat sacrificial food.

אמר רבא מדרסות קאמרת שאני מדרסות Rava said: Are you saying that one can cite proof from the halakha of items rendered impure by treading that the state of purity of teruma is impurity vis-à-vis sacrificial food? No proof may be cited from there, as the decree that the halakhic status of the garments of priests who partake of teruma is like that of items rendered impure by treading for those who eat sacrificial food is different,

ס"ד אמינא הואיל ואסירי בגיזה ועבודה דמן לבעי קבורה קמשמע לן It could enter your mind to say: Since benefit from disqualified consecrated animals is forbidden with regard to their fleece and labor, perhaps benefit from their blood is also forbidden, and let it require burial. Therefore, the verse teaches us that benefit from their blood is permitted.

תנא דבי רבי ישמעאל (במדבר כג, כד) ודם חללים ישתה פרט לדם קילוח שאינו מכשיר את הזרעים The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that the verse: “And drinks the blood of carcasses,” from which it is derived that the blood of an animal that was killed renders food items susceptible to ritual impurity, serves to exclude blood that emerges in a surge due to arterial pressure at the moment of slaughter while the animal is still alive that does not render seeds susceptible to ritual impurity.

ת"ר השוחט והתיז דם על הדלעת רבי אומר הוכשר רבי חייא אומר תולין § The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to one who slaughters an animal and splashed blood of the slaughter on a gourd of teruma, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The gourd is rendered susceptible to ritual impurity. Rabbi Ḥiyya says: If the gourd came into contact with a source of impurity, one places the matter in abeyance, as there is uncertainty whether the blood rendered it susceptible to impurity.

א"ר אושעיא מאחר שרבי אומר הוכשר ור' חייא אומר תולין אנו על מי נסמוך באו ונסמוך על דברי ר"ש שהיה ר"ש אומר שחיטה מכשרת ולא דם Rabbi Oshaya said: Since Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that the gourd is rendered susceptible to ritual impurity and Rabbi Ḥiyya says that one places the matter in abeyance, on whom shall we rely? Come and let us rely on the statement of Rabbi Shimon, as Rabbi Shimon would say: It is slaughter that renders the animal susceptible, and not blood.

אמר רב פפא הכל מודים היכא דאיתיה לדם מתחלה ועד סוף כולי עלמא לא פליגי דמכשיר כי פליגי בנתקנח הדם בין סימן לסימן רבי סבר ישנה לשחיטה מתחלה ועד סוף והאי דם שחיטה הוא Rav Pappa said in explanation: Everyone, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Ḥiyya, agrees that where there is blood on the gourd throughout the slaughter continuously from beginning to end, everyone, both Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who says: Slaughter is defined only as the conclusion of its performance, and Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says: Slaughter is defined from the beginning to the end of its performance, agrees that the blood renders the gourd susceptible to impurity, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Shimon. When they disagree is in a case where the blood is wiped off the gourd between the cutting of one siman and the other siman. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that slaughter is defined from the beginning to the end of its performance, and this blood that splashed on the gourd is blood of slaughter.

רבי חייא סבר אינה לשחיטה אלא בסוף והאי דם מכה הוא ומאי תולין תולין הדבר עד גמר שחיטה אי איתיה לדם בסוף שחיטה מכשיר ואי לא לא מכשיר Rabbi Ḥiyya holds that slaughter is defined only as the conclusion of its performance, and this is blood of a wound, which does not render food items susceptible to ritual impurity. And what is the meaning of the ruling of Rabbi Ḥiyya that one places the matter in abeyance? It means that one places the matter in abeyance until the conclusion of the slaughter. If there is blood remaining on the gourd at the conclusion of the slaughter the blood renders the gourd susceptible to ritual impurity, and if not, the blood does not render the gourd susceptible to ritual impurity.

ומאי באו ונסמוך על דברי ר"ש לר"ש לא מכשיר לרבי חייא מכשיר The Gemara asks: And what is the meaning of the statement of Rabbi Oshaya: Come and let us rely on the statement of Rabbi Shimon? According to Rabbi Shimon the blood of slaughter does not render food items susceptible to ritual impurity, while according to Rabbi Ḥiyya the blood of slaughter renders the gourd susceptible to ritual impurity.

בנתקנח מיהו אשוו להדדי מר לא מכשיר ומר לא מכשיר הוה ליה רבי חד ואין דבריו של אחד במקום שנים The Gemara answers that in a case where the blood is wiped off the gourd prior to the conclusion of slaughter, in any event, the opinions of Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Ḥiyya correspond to each other: One Sage holds that the blood of slaughter does not render the gourd susceptible to ritual impurity and the other Sage holds that the blood of slaughter does not render the gourd susceptible to ritual impurity. The result is that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that the blood of slaughter renders the gourd susceptible to ritual impurity, is one Sage stating an individual opinion, and the statement of one Sage has no standing in a place where it is disputed by two Sages.

רב אשי אמר תולין לעולם משמע ונתקנח לר' חייא ספוקי מספקא ליה אי ישנה לשחיטה מתחלה ועד סוף או אינה לשחיטה אלא בסוף ומאי תולין לא אוכלין ולא שורפין Rav Ashi said that the term: One places the matter in abeyance, indicates that it remains in abeyance forever. It is a fundamental halakhic uncertainty for which there is no resolution. And in the case where the blood is wiped off the gourd prior to the conclusion of the slaughter, the halakha is unclear. This is because Rabbi Ḥiyya is uncertain whether slaughter is defined from the beginning to the end of its performance or whether slaughter is defined only as the conclusion of its performance. And what is the meaning of his ruling that one places the matter in abeyance? It means that if a source of impurity comes into contact with the gourd after the blood was wiped off the gourd, one may neither eat the gourd, as perhaps it is impure teruma, nor may one burn it, as perhaps it is pure.

ומאי באו ונסמוך על דברי ר"ש לר"ש לא מכשיר לרבי חייא ספיקא לענין שריפה מיהו שוו להדדי מר לא שרפיה ומר לא שרפיה The Gemara asks: And according to this explanation, what is the meaning of the statement of Rabbi Oshaya: Come and let us rely on the statement of Rabbi Shimon? According to Rabbi Shimon the blood of slaughter does not render food items susceptible to ritual impurity, while according to Rabbi Ḥiyya, there is uncertainty with regard to the status of the gourd. The Gemara answers that with regard to the matter of burning, in any event, the opinions of Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Ḥiyya correspond to each other: One Sage, Rabbi Shimon, does not burn the gourd, because it was not rendered susceptible to impurity, and the other Sage, Rabbi Ḥiyya, does not burn the gourd, due to the uncertainty.

הוה ליה רבי חד ואין דבריו של אחד במקום שנים והכי קאמר כגון זאת תולין לא אוכלין ולא שורפין The result is that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that one burns the gourd since the blood of slaughter renders the gourd susceptible to ritual impurity and contact with a source of impurity renders it impure, is one Sage stating an individual opinion, and the statement of one Sage has no standing in a place where it is disputed by two Sages. And this is what Rabbi Ḥiyya is saying: In a case such as this, one places the matter in abeyance; one may neither eat the gourd nor burn it.

בעי ר"ש בן לקיש צריד של מנחות מונין בו ראשון ושני או אין מונין בו ראשון ושני כי מהניא חבת הקדש לאפסולי גופיה למימנא ביה ראשון ושני לא או דלמא לא שנא Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish raises a dilemma: With regard to a dry portion of consecrated flour that was not mixed with the oil of meal offerings, does one count the descending levels of impurity characteristic of other foods that come into contact with a primary source of impurity, i.e., that food assumes first-degree impurity, and food that comes into contact with that food assumes second-degree impurity; or does one not count the descending levels of first-degree impurity and second-degree impurity? The Gemara elaborates: When regard for sanctity is effective in rendering an item susceptible to impurity, is it effective only to disqualify that item itself, but to count the descending levels of first-degree and second-degree impurity it is not effective? Or perhaps once it is rendered susceptible to impurity there is no difference whether it is rendered susceptible by means of regard for sanctity or by means of contact with liquids.

א"ר אלעזר ת"ש (ויקרא יא, לד) מכל האוכל אשר יאכל וגו' אוכל הבא במים הוכשר אוכל שאינו בא במים לא הוכשר Rabbi Elazar said: Come and hear proof from a baraita. It is written: “Of all food that may be eaten, on which water comes, it shall be impure; and all drink that may be drunk it shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:34). From that verse it is derived: Food that comes into contact with water is rendered susceptible to ritual impurity and to count the descending levels of impurity, but food that does not come into contact with water is not rendered susceptible to ritual impurity. Apparently, for the dry portion of flour that did not come into contact with a liquid but was rendered susceptible by regard for sanctity, one does not count the descending levels of impurity.

אטו רבי שמעון בן לקיש לית ליה אוכל הבא במים רבי שמעון בן לקיש הכי קמיבעיא ליה חבת הקדש כאוכל הבא במים דמי או לא The Gemara asks: Is that to say that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish does not have knowledge of the halakha that only food that comes into contact with water is susceptible to ritual impurity? The Gemara answers: This is the dilemma that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish is raising: Is the halakhic status of consecrated food that is subject to regard for sanctity like that of food that comes into contact with water, and one does not count the descending levels of impurity for items that come into contact with it, or no, its halakhic status is unique?

רבי אלעזר נמי מיתורי קראי קאמר מכדי כתיב (ויקרא יא, לח) וכי יותן מים על זרע מכל האוכל אשר יאכל למה לי The Gemara explains that Rabbi Elazar, who cited the verse to resolve the dilemma of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, is not merely citing a verse that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish knows. Rather, he too is stating his proof from the extraneous formulation of the verses. Since it is written: “But when water is placed upon the seed, and any of their carcass falls upon it, it is impure for you” (Leviticus 11:38), why do I need the verse: “Of all food which may be eaten, on which water comes, shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:34)?

לאו למעוטי חיבת הקדש לא חד בטומאת מת וחד בטומאת שרץ Is it not to exclude items rendered susceptible to impurity due to regard for sanctity? The Gemara rejects that proof: No, both verses teach that food becomes impure only after it is rendered susceptible to impurity by one of the seven liquids. One verse is referring to impurity imparted by a corpse, and one verse is referring to impurity imparted by the carcass of a creeping animal.

וצריכי דאי אשמעינן טומאת מת התם הוא דבעי הכשר משום דלא מטמא בכעדשה אבל שרץ דמטמא בכעדשה אימא לא ליבעי הכשר And both verses are necessary, as had the Torah taught us the requirement of being rendered susceptible to impurity only with regard to impurity imparted by a corpse, one would have concluded that it is there that food requires being rendered susceptible to impurity by one of the seven liquids in order to become impure, due to the fact that the impurity imparted by a corpse is less stringent, as a portion of a corpse the size of a lentil-bulk does not render people or vessels impure. But in the case of impurity imparted by the carcass of a creeping animal, which is more stringent, as the creeping animal renders people or vessels impure with a portion of it the size of a lentil-bulk, say that food does not require to be rendered susceptible by one of the seven liquids in order to become impure.

ואי אשמעינן שרץ משום דלא מטמא טומאת שבעה אבל מת דמטמא טומאת שבעה אימא לא ליבעי הכשר צריכא And had the Torah taught us the requirement of being rendered susceptible to impurity only with regard to impurity imparted by the carcass of a creeping animal, one would have concluded that it is there that food must be rendered susceptible to impurity, due to the fact that the impurity imparted by a creeping animal is less stringent, as a creeping animal does not render people or vessels impure with impurity that lasts seven days. But with regard to a corpse, which renders people or vessels impure with impurity that lasts seven days, say that food does not require to be rendered susceptible by one of the seven liquids in order to become impure from it. Therefore, it is necessary for the Torah to teach both verses.

מתיב רב יוסף רבי שמעון אומר הוכשרו בשחיטה הוכשרו ואפילו למימני בהו ראשון ושני Rav Yosef raises an objection from the mishna (33a) to Rabbi Elazar’s opinion that only with regard to food rendered susceptible by one of the seven liquids does one count the descending levels of impurity, i.e., first-degree impurity and second-degree impurity: Rabbi Shimon says: They were rendered susceptible to ritual impurity by means of the slaughter itself. Rabbi Shimon is saying they were rendered susceptible in every sense, and even to count the descending levels of impurity, first-degree impurity and second-degree impurity.

אמאי והא לאו אוכל הבא במים הוא א"ל אביי עשאוהו כהכשר מים מדרבנן Why is the animal rendered susceptible to impurity in every sense; but the slaughtered animal is not food that comes into contact with water? Apparently, even items that did not come into contact with water are susceptible to impurity in every sense. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Rabbi Shimon holds that it is not susceptible by Torah law. Rather, the Sages accorded susceptibility via slaughter of the animal a status like that of susceptibility rendered by means of water, by rabbinic law.

אמר רבי זירא ת"ש הבוצר לגת שמאי אומר הוכשר הלל אומר לא הוכשר ושתיק ליה הלל לשמאי אמאי והא לאו אוכל הבא במים הוא אמר ליה אביי עשאוהו כהכשר מים מדרבנן Rabbi Zeira said: Come and hear an objection to Rabbi Elazar’s opinion from a baraita: In the case of one who harvests grapes in order to take them to the winepress, Shammai says: The grapes are rendered susceptible to ritual impurity by the liquid that seeps from them, and Hillel says: They are not rendered susceptible to ritual impurity; and ultimately, Hillel was silent and did not respond to Shammai, accepting his opinion. Why does that liquid render the grapes susceptible to impurity; but the grapes are not food that comes into contact with water? Contact with liquid renders food susceptible to impurity only if the contact was with the intent of the owner, and here, the liquid did not seep out of the grapes of one’s own volition. Abaye said to Rabbi Zeira: Hillel does not hold that the grapes are susceptible by Torah law; rather, the Sages accorded susceptibility via the liquid a status like that of susceptibility rendered by means of water, by rabbinic law, to count the descending levels of impurity, i.e., first-degree impurity, second-degree impurity.

א"ל רב יוסף אמינא לך אנא הוכשרו בשחיטה ואת אמרת לי עשאוהו כהכשר מים ואמר לך רבי זירא ואמרת ליה עשאוהו כהכשר מים לר"ש בן לקיש נמי עשאוהו כהכשר מים Rav Yosef said to Abaye: I said to you an objection from the statement of Rabbi Shimon: They were rendered susceptible to ritual impurity by means of the slaughter itself, and you said to me: It was the Sages who accorded susceptibility via slaughter of the animal a status like that of susceptibility rendered by means of water. And Rabbi Zeira said to you an objection from the case of one who harvests grapes, and you said to him: It is the Sages who accorded susceptibility via the liquid from the grapes a status like that of susceptibility rendered by means of water. If so, will you also say in response to the dilemma of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish with regard to a dry portion of consecrated flour that was not mixed with the oil of meal offerings that it is the Sages who accorded susceptibility via the regard for sanctity of the flour a status like that of susceptibility rendered by means of water, by rabbinic law, to count the descending levels of impurity, i.e., first-degree impurity, second-degree impurity?

אמר ליה אטו ר' שמעון בן לקיש לתלות קמיבעיא ליה כי קא מיבעיא ליה לשרוף Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Is that to say that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish was raising a dilemma with regard to placing the matter in abeyance, and one may neither eat the consecrated flour nor may one burn it, which would be the case for impurity by rabbinic law? When Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish raises the dilemma it is with regard to whether to burn the gourd, which is the case when the impurity is by Torah law.

מכלל דחיבת הקדש דאורייתא מנא לן אילימא מדכתיב (ויקרא ז, יט) והבשר אשר יגע בכל טמא האי בשר דאתכשר במאי The Gemara notes that it may be learned by inference that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish holds that regard for sanctity renders sacred items subject to ritual impurity by Torah law, as his dilemma was limited to whether one counts the descending levels of impurity from those susceptible items, i.e., first-degree impurity, second-degree impurity, not the impurity of the sacred item itself. From where do we derive this halakha? If we say that it is derived from that which is written: “And the flesh that touches any impure item shall not be eaten; it shall be burned with fire” (Leviticus 7:19), then it must be ascertained: This flesh that was rendered susceptible to ritual impurity, by what means was it rendered susceptible?

אילימא דאתכשר בדם והאמר רבי חייא בר אבא א"ר יוחנן מנין לדם קדשים שאינו מכשיר שנאמר לא תאכלנו על הארץ תשפכנו כמים דם הנשפך כמים מכשיר שאינו נשפך כמים אינו מכשיר If we say that it was rendered susceptible to impurity by means of the blood of the animal, this is difficult. But doesn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: From where is it derived with regard to blood of sacrificial animals that it does not render food susceptible to impurity? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “You shall not eat it; you shall pour it upon the earth like water” (Deuteronomy 12:24). Blood of a non-sacred animal, which is poured like water when it is slaughtered, renders food susceptible to ritual impurity. By contrast, blood of a sacrificial animal, which is not poured like water but is presented on the altar, does not render food susceptible to impurity.

אלא דאיתכשר במשקי בית מטבחיא והא א"ר יוסי ברבי חנינא משקי בית מטבחיא לא דיין שהן דכן אלא שאין מכשירין וכי תימא תרגמא אדם והא משקי קאמר אלא לאו דאתכשר בחבת הקדש Rather, perhaps say that the flesh was rendered susceptible to ritual impurity by means of the liquids of the Temple abattoir. But didn’t Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, say: With regard to the liquids of the Temple abattoir, not only are they ritually pure, but they do not even render food susceptible to impurity. And if you would say that one should explain the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, as referring exclusively to blood, and the other liquids render food susceptible, but doesn’t he say: Liquids, in the plural? Rather, is it not that the flesh was rendered susceptible to ritual impurity via regard for sanctity?

ודלמא כדרב יהודה אמר שמואל דאמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל כגון שהיתה לו פרה של זבחי שלמים והעבירה בנחל שחטה ועדיין משקה טופח עליה The Gemara responds: And perhaps the verse can be explained in accordance with the statement that Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says, as Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The verse is referring to a case where one had a cow that was to be sacrificed as a peace offering, and since the owner is entitled to the meat and the hide of the animal, in order to improve their quality he conveyed it through the river and slaughtered the animal while the liquid was still upon it and the animal was damp. That liquid rendered the meat susceptible to impurity.

אלא מסיפא והבשר לרבות עצים ולבונה עצים ולבונה בני אכילה נינהו אלא חבת הקדש מכשרא להו ומשויא להו אוכל הכא נמי חבת הקדש מכשרתה Rather the proof is from the latter portion of that verse: “And the flesh that touches any impure item shall not be eaten; it shall be burned with fire. And the flesh, every pure person may eat flesh” (Leviticus 7:19). The Gemara explains: The second mention of the term “and the flesh” in the verse is superfluous and serves to include the halakha that with regard to sacred wood and frankincense, impurity disqualifies them from being burned on the altar. Are wood and frankincense edible and therefore included in the verse: “Of all food that may be eaten, on which water comes, shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:34)? Rather, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish derived from this that regard for sanctity renders them susceptible to ritual impurity and renders their status like that of food. Here too, in the case of a dry portion of flour that was not mixed with the oil of meal offerings, regard for sanctity renders it susceptible to ritual impurity.

מאי כי מהניא חבת הקדש לפסולא דגופיה אבל למימנא ביה ראשון ושני לא או דלמא לא שנא תיקו: The Gemara asks: What is the resolution of the dilemma raised by Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: When regard for sanctity is effective in rendering an item susceptible to impurity, is it only to disqualify that item itself, but to count the descending levels of first-degree impurity and second-degree impurity, it is not effective; or perhaps once it is rendered susceptible to impurity there is no difference whether it is rendered susceptible by means of regard for sanctity or by means of contact with liquids? The Gemara answers: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

מתני׳ השוחט את המסוכנת רשב"ג אומר עד שתפרכס ביד וברגל ר"א אומר דיה אם זינקה אמר ר"ש השוחט בלילה ולמחר השכים ומצא כתלים מלאים דם כשרה שזינקה וכמדת ר"א וחכ"א עד שתפרכס או ביד או ברגל או עד שתכשכש בזנבה MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters an animal that is in danger of imminent death, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The slaughter is valid only in a case where after the slaughter it convulses with its foreleg and with its hind leg. Rabbi Eliezer says: It is sufficient if blood spurted from the neck. Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of one who slaughters at night and the next day he awoke and found walls full of blood, the slaughter is valid, as it is clear that the blood spurted, and this is in accordance with the rule of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: It is valid only in a case where it convulses with its foreleg or with its hind leg, or in a case where it wags its tail.

אחד בהמה דקה ואחד בהמה גסה בהמה דקה שפשטה ידה ולא החזירה פסולה שאינה אלא הוצאת נפש בלבד במה דברים אמורים שהיתה בחזקת מסוכנת אבל אם היתה בחזקת בריאה אפי' אין בה אחד מכל הסימנים הללו כשרה: This is the halakha with regard to both a small animal, e.g., a sheep, and a large animal, e.g., a cow, that is in danger of imminent death. The slaughter of a small animal that when being slaughtered extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. In what case is this statement said? It is in a case where the presumptive status of the animal was that it was in danger of imminent death. But if its presumptive status was that it was healthy, then even if there were none of these indicators, the slaughter is valid.

גמ׳ מסוכנת ממאי דשריא וממאי תיסק אדעתין דאסירא דכתיב (ויקרא יא, ב) זאת החיה אשר תאכלו חיה אכול ושאינה חיה לא תאכל והא מסוכנת אינה חיה GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where is it known that the flesh of an animal in danger of imminent death is permitted by means of slaughter? The Gemara responds with a question: And from where would it enter your mind that it is prohibited? The Gemara explains that one may have thought it is prohibited, as it is written: “These are the living beings [haḥayya] that you may eat among all the animals that are on the earth” (Leviticus 11:2). One might have thought that the verse is saying: Eat an animal that is fit to live [ḥayya], but do not eat an animal that is not fit to live. And this animal in danger of imminent death is not fit to live.

מדאמר רחמנא (דברים יד, כא) נבלה לא תאכל מכלל דמסוכנת שריא דאי ס"ד מסוכנת אסירא השתא מחיים אסירא לאחר מיתה מיבעי The fact that its meat is permitted is derived from the fact that the Merciful One states that you shall not eat an unslaughtered animal carcass, as it is written: “You shall not eat any unslaughtered carcass” (Deuteronomy 14:21); one learns by inference that eating the meat of an animal in danger of imminent death is permitted. As, if it enters your mind that eating the meat of an animal in danger of imminent death is prohibited, now if an animal is prohibited while alive, is it necessary to state that it is prohibited after death?

ודלמא היינו נבלה היינו מסוכנת לא ס"ד דכתיב (ויקרא יא, לט) וכי ימות מן הבהמה אשר היא לכם לאכלה הנוגע בנבלתה לאחר מיתה הוא דקרייה רחמנא נבלה מחיים לא אקרי נבלה The Gemara rejects that proof. And that is not a legitimate inference, as perhaps the halakhic status of an unslaughtered carcass is the same as that of an animal in danger of imminent death, and the prohibition: “You shall not eat any unslaughtered carcass,” includes both. The Gemara answers: It would not enter your mind to say so, as it is written: “And if any animal of which you may eat dies, one who touches its carcass shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:39). This indicates that it is after death that the Merciful One calls the animal a carcass; while alive, the animal is not called a carcass.

ודלמא לעולם אימא לך היינו נבלה היינו מסוכנת מחיים בעשה לאחר מיתה בלאו The Gemara questions that understanding. And perhaps, actually I will say to you: The halakhic status of an unslaughtered carcass is the same as that of an animal in danger of imminent death, but if one slaughters the animal in danger of imminent death while alive, he would be in violation of a positive mitzva: “These are the living beings that you may eat” (Leviticus 11:2), whereas after its death, he would be in violation of a prohibition: “You shall not eat any unslaughtered carcass” (Deuteronomy 14:21).

אלא מדאמר רחמנא (שמות כב, ל) טרפה לא תאכל מכלל דמסוכנת שריא דאי ס"ד מסוכנת אסירא השתא מסוכנת דלא מחסרא אסירא טרפה מיבעיא Rather, the fact that its meat is permitted is derived from the fact that the Merciful One states you shall not eat that an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa], as it is written: “And you shall not eat any animal that was mauled in the field [tereifa]” (Exodus 22:30). From here, one learns by inference that eating the meat of an animal in danger of imminent death is permitted. As, if it enters your mind that eating the meat of an animal in danger of imminent death is prohibited, now that an animal in danger of imminent death that is not lacking any limb is prohibited, is it necessary to state that a tereifa, an animal that was mauled and lacking body parts, is prohibited?

ודלמא היינו טרפה היינו מסוכנת ולעבור עליו בעשה ולא תעשה א"כ נבלה דכתב רחמנא ל"ל ומה מחיים קאי עלה בלאו ועשה לאחר מיתה מיבעיא The Gemara rejects that proof. And that is not a legitimate inference, as perhaps the halakhic status of a tereifa that is lacking body parts is the same as that of an animal in danger of imminent death that is not lacking body parts, and both are included in the category of tereifa. This would render one who slaughters either to be in violation of both a positive mitzva: “These are the living beings that you may eat,” and a prohibition: “And you shall not eat any animal that was mauled in the field [tereifa].” The Gemara questions that understanding: If so, why do I need the prohibition that the Merciful One writes with regard to an unslaughtered carcass? If while an animal is alive one stands in violation of a prohibition and a positive mitzva, is it necessary to state that it is prohibited after death?

ודלמא היינו נבלה היינו טרפה היינו מסוכנת ולעבור עליו בשני לאוין ועשה The Gemara objects: And that is not a legitimate question, as perhaps the halakhic status of an unslaughtered carcass is the same as a tereifa that is lacking body parts, and is the same as that of an animal in danger of imminent death that is not lacking body parts. Therefore, when the Torah writes the word “carcass,” it is the same as though it had written tereifa and the same as though it had written an animal in danger of imminent death. The Torah prohibits each, and the result will be that he will violate two prohibitions and a positive mitzva.

אלא מהכא (ויקרא ז, כד) וחלב נבלה וחלב טרפה יעשה לכל מלאכה ואכל לא תאכלוהו ואמר מר למאי הלכתא אמרה התורה יבא איסור נבלה ויחול על איסור חלב יבא איסור טרפה ויחול על איסור חלב Rather, the fact that the meat of an animal in danger of imminent death is permitted is derived from here: “And the fat of a carcass and the fat of a tereifa may be used for any purpose; but you shall not eat it” (Leviticus 7:24). And the Master says: In order to derive what halakha is this verse written? Would one imagine that because it is an unslaughtered carcass or a tereifa its fat would be permitted for consumption? The Torah states: Let the prohibition against eating an unslaughtered carcass come and take effect upon the prohibition against eating forbidden fat, which already exists. One who eats the forbidden fat of an unslaughtered carcass is liable for violation of both prohibitions. Likewise, the word “tereifa” in the verse teaches: Let the prohibition against eating a tereifa come and take effect upon the prohibition against eating forbidden fat, which already exists, so that one who eats the forbidden fat of a tereifa is liable for transgressing both prohibitions.

ואי סלקא דעתך טרפה היינו מסוכנת לכתוב רחמנא חלב נבלה יעשה לכל מלאכה וחלב טרפה לא תאכלוהו ואנא אמינא ומה מחיים אתי איסור טרפה חייל אאיסור חלב לאחר מיתה מיבעיא And if it enters your mind to say that the halakhic status of a tereifa lacking body parts is the same as that of an animal in danger of imminent death, let the Merciful One write: And the fat of a carcass may be used for any purpose, and the fat of a tereifa you shall not eat. The prohibition against eating the forbidden fat should have been written exclusively with regard to a tereifa, and I would say: If while an animal is alive and in danger of imminent death the prohibition against eating a tereifa takes effect upon the prohibition against eating forbidden fat, is it necessary to state that after its death the prohibition against eating an unslaughtered carcass takes effect upon the prohibition against eating forbidden fat?

אלא מדכתב רחמנא (ויקרא ז, כד) נבלה מכלל דטרפה לאו היינו מסוכנת The Gemara concludes: Rather, from the fact that the Merciful One writes that the prohibition against eating an unslaughtered carcass takes effect upon the prohibition against eating forbidden fat, one learns by inference that the tereifa in the verse is not the same as an animal in danger of imminent death. Rather, the tereifa in the verse is an animal that was mauled and is lacking body parts, and it is only that animal that is prohibited after slaughter. Eating an animal in danger of imminent death after slaughter is permitted.

מתקיף לה מר בר רב אשי ודלמא לעולם אימא לך היינו טרפה היינו מסוכנת ודקאמרת נבלה דכתב רחמנא ל"ל להך נבלה דלא אתיא מכח מסוכנת והיכי דמי שעשאה גיסטרא התם נמי אי אפשר דלא הוי מסוכנת פורתא מקמי דליפסק לרובא Mar bar Rav Ashi objects to this: And perhaps, actually I will say to you that the halakhic status of a tereifa is the same as that of an animal in danger of imminent death, and with regard to that which you said: Why do I need the prohibition with regard to an unslaughtered carcass that the Merciful One writes, one can explain that it is necessary for that unslaughtered carcass that does not come as a result of danger of imminent death. And what are the circumstances of that unslaughtered carcass? It is in a case where one rendered the animal like a shard, by cutting it into two widthwise. The Gemara rejects that distinction: There too, in the case where one rendered the animal like a shard, it is impossible that the animal was not at least somewhat in danger of imminent death before he cut the majority of the animal.

ואיבעית אימא א"כ לימא חלב נבלה וטרפה חלב חלב למה לי זו היא שאין חלבה חלוק מבשרה ויש לך אחרת שחלבה חלוק מבשרה ואיזו זו מסוכנת And if you wish, say instead that there is a different source for the fact that the meat of an animal in danger of imminent death is permitted. If it is so that an animal in danger of imminent death is included in the category of tereifa, let the verse say: The fat of an unslaughtered carcass and a tereifa. Why do I need it to be written: “Fat of a carcass and the fat of a tereifa”? The term “fat” is repeated to teach that it is this case where the status of its fat is not distinct from the status of its meat, and both are prohibited; but you have another case where the status of its fat, which is forbidden, is distinct from the status of its meat, which is permitted. And which case is that? That is the case of an animal in danger of imminent death.

ואיבעית אימא מהכא (יחזקאל ד, יד) ואומר אהה ה' אלהים הנה נפשי לא מטומאה ונבלה וטרפה לא אכלתי מנעורי ועד עתה ולא בא בפי בשר פגול And if you wish, say instead that it is derived from here: “Then I said: Ah, Lord God, my soul has not become impure; and from my youth until now I have not eaten an unslaughtered carcass or a tereifa, and no piggul flesh came into my mouth” (Ezekiel 4:14).

הנה נפשי לא מטומאה שלא הרהרתי ביום לבא לידי טומאה בלילה ונבלה וטרפה לא אכלתי מנעורי שלא אכלתי בשר כוס כוס מעולם ולא בא בפי בשר פגול שלא אכלתי מבהמה שהורה בה חכם משום רבי נתן אמרו שלא אכלתי מבהמה שלא הורמו מתנותיה The Gemara explains: “My soul has not become impure” means that I did not consider any sinful thoughts during the day that would cause me to come to impurity due to a seminal emission at night. “And from my youth until now I have not eaten an unslaughtered carcass or a tereifa” means that I never ate the flesh of an animal that was in danger of imminent death, leading one to say: Slaughter it, slaughter it quickly, before it dies. “And no piggul flesh came into my mouth” means that I never ate from an animal with regard to which there was uncertainty whether it is forbidden and a Sage issued a ruling to permit it. They said in the name of Rabbi Natan that the last portion of the verse means: That I never ate from an animal whose gifts to which members of the priesthood are entitled, i.e., the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw, were not already separated.

אי אמרת בשלמא שריא היינו רבותיה דיחזקאל אלא אי אמרת אסירא מאי רבותיה דיחזקאל The proof is: Granted, if you say that it is permitted to slaughter and eat an animal in imminent danger of death, then that is the greatness of Ezekiel, as, although eating it is permitted, he refrained from doing so. But if you say that it is forbidden to slaughter and eat that animal, what in that action attests to the greatness of Ezekiel? Apparently, it is permitted to slaughter and eat an animal in danger of imminent death.

ה"ד מסוכנת אמר רב יהודה אמר רב כל שמעמידין אותה ואינה עומדת רב חנינא בר שלמיא משמיה דרב אמר אפילו אוכלת בקעיות רמי בר יחזקאל אמר אפילו אוכלת קורות § The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of an animal in danger of imminent death? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It is any animal with regard to which one stands it on its feet but it does not stand unaided. Rav Ḥanina bar Shelamya in the name of Rav said: That indicator is so clear that even if that animal maintains sufficient strength in its jaw and eats pieces of wood, if it is unable to stand, its status is that of an animal in danger of imminent death. Rami bar Yeḥezkel said: That is the case even if that animal eats beams.

בסורא מתני הכי בפומבדיתא מתני הכי היכי דמיא מסוכנת אמר רב יהודה אמר רב כל שמעמידין אותה ואינה עומדת ואפילו אוכלת בקעיות רמי בר יחזקאל אמר אפילו אוכלת קורות In Sura, they would teach the exchange in that manner. In Pumbedita, they would teach the exchange in this manner: What are the circumstances of an animal in danger of imminent death? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It is any animal with regard to which one stands it on its feet but it does not stand unaided, even if that animal maintains sufficient strength in its jaw and eats pieces of wood. Rami bar Yeḥezkel said: That indicator is so clear that even if that animal maintains sufficient strength in its jaw and eats beams, if it is unable to stand its status is that of an animal in danger of imminent death.

אשכחינהו שמואל לתלמידי דרב אמר להו מאי אמר רב במסוכנת אמרו ליה הכי אמר רב Shmuel found students of Rav after Rav’s death. He said to them: What did Rav say with regard to an animal in danger of imminent death? They said to him: This is what Rav said:

גועה והטילה ריעי וכשכשה באזנה הרי זה פירכוס אמר להו אצטריכא ליה לאבא לאזוזי אוני שאני אומר כל שאינו דברים שהמיתה עושה If the animal lows, or excreted excrement, or wiggled its ear during the slaughter, that is a convulsion, and the slaughter renders eating the flesh of the animal permitted. Shmuel said to them: Is it necessary according to Abba, i.e., Rav, for the animal to move its ears during the slaughter, which requires a considerable life force? As I say: Any movements of the animal that are not matters that the death of the animal engenders are convulsions sufficient to render the slaughter valid.

מאי נינהו דברים שהמיתה עושה אמר רב ענן לדידי מפרשא לי מיניה דמר שמואל היתה ידה כפופה ופשטתה דבר שהמיתה עושה פשוטה וכפפה דברים שאין המיתה עושה The Gemara asks: What are matters that the death of the animal engenders? Rav Anan said: This was explained to me from Master Shmuel himself: If the animal’s foreleg was bent, and the animal straightened it, that is a matter that the death of the animal engenders. But if its foreleg was straight and the animal bent it, that is among the matters that the death of the animal does not engender and is a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid.

מאי קמ"ל תנינא בהמה דקה שפשטה ידה ולא החזירה פסולה שאינה אלא הוצאת נפש הא החזירה כשרה The Gemara asks: What is Shmuel teaching us with that statement? We already learn in the mishna: The slaughter of a small animal that during its slaughter extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is nothing other than part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. But one may infer that if the animal does restore its foreleg to the bent position, that indicates life and the slaughter is valid.

אי ממתני' הוה אמינא דוקא דכייפה ופשטה והדר כייפה לה אבל פשוטה וכפפתה לא קמ"ל The Gemara answers: If the halakha is learned from the mishna alone, I would say that it is specifically in a case where the animal’s foreleg had been bent, and the animal now straightens it and then bends it, that the slaughter is valid. But if the foreleg had been straight and the animal bent it, the slaughter is not valid. Therefore, Shmuel teaches us that if its foreleg was straight and the animal bent it; that is a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid.

מיתיבי ר' יוסי אומר היה ר"מ אומר גועה בשעת שחיטה אין זה פירכוס ר"א ברבי יוסי אומר משמו אפילו הטילה ריעי וכשכשה בזנבה אין זה פירכוס קשיא גועה אגועה קשיא ריעי אריעי The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita to Rav’s statement cited earlier. Rabbi Yosei says that Rabbi Meir would say: If an animal lows during its slaughter, that is not a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, says in the name of Rabbi Yosei: Even if the animal excreted excrement or wagged its tail, that is not a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid. The Gemara now clarifies: Rabbi Yosei’s statement in the baraita that if an animal lows it is not a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid is difficult, as it contradicts the statement of Rav that if an animal lows it is a convulsion. And Rabbi Elazar’s statement in the baraita that if an animal excreted excrement it is not a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid is difficult, as it contradicts the statement of Rav that if an animal excreted excrement it is a convulsion.

גועה אגועה לא קשיא הא דעבי קלה הא דעמי קלה ריעי אריעי נמי לא קשיא כאן בשותתת כאן במתרזת The Gemara answers: The apparent contradiction between the opinion that when an animal lows it is a convulsion and the opinion that when an animal lows it is not a convulsion is not difficult. This opinion, that it is a convulsion, is referring to a case where the animal’s voice is rich and powerful, a clear indication of life; that opinion, that it is not a convulsion, is referring to a case where the animal’s voice is muted, which is not an indication of life. The apparent contradiction between the opinion that when an animal excreted excrement it is a convulsion and the opinion that when an animal excreted excrement it is not a convulsion is also not difficult. Here, the opinion that it is not a convulsion is referring to a case where the animal expels the excrement in a trickle. That is not an indication of life. There, the opinion that it is a convulsion is referring to a case where the animal expels the excrement with force. That is an indication of life.

אמר רב חסדא פירכוס שאמרו בסוף שחיטה מאי בסוף שחיטה באמצע שחיטה לאפוקי תחלת שחיטה דלא § The Gemara continues its definition of convulsion that indicates life. Rav Ḥisda said: I was taught that the convulsion that the Sages said is an indication of life is a convulsion at the conclusion of the act of slaughter. Rav Ḥisda elaborates: What is the meaning of: At the conclusion of the act of slaughter? It means even in the midst of the slaughter. The Sages said that it must be at the conclusion of the slaughter only to exclude convulsions at the beginning of the act of slaughter, which are not an indication of life.

אמר רב חסדא מנא אמינא לה דתנן בהמה דקה שפשטה ידה ולא החזירה פסולה אימת אילימא בסוף שחיטה כל היכי תיחי ותיזיל אלא לאו באמצע שחיטה Rav Ḥisda said: From where do I say that a convulsion in the midst of the act of slaughter is an indication of life? It is from the mishna, as we learned: The slaughter of a small animal that when being slaughtered extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. Rav Ḥisda elaborates: When did the animal extend its foreleg but not restore it? If we say that it occurred at the conclusion of the slaughter, must the animal continue living for so extended a period that it restores its leg to its bent position after the slaughter is complete? Is the slaughter truly not valid otherwise? Rather, is it not that the mishna is referring to a case where the animal extends its foreleg in the middle of the slaughter? If so, then when it restores its leg as well, it is considered a convulsion that indicates life.

א"ל רבא לעולם בסוף שחיטה שאני אומר כל שאינה עושה כן בסוף שחיטה בידוע שנשמתה נטולה הימנה קודם לכן Rava said to Rav Ḥisda: That is no proof. Actually, one could explain that the mishna is referring to a case where the animal extends its foreleg but did not restore it to the bent position at the conclusion of the slaughter, as I say with regard to any animal that does not do so at the conclusion of the slaughter, it is known that its soul was taken from it before that moment, and it was not alive.

ר"נ בר יצחק אמר פירכוס שאמרו בתחלת שחיטה Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The convulsion that the Sages said is an indication of life is a convulsion even at the beginning of the act of slaughter.

אמר ר"נ בר יצחק מנא אמינא לה דתנן אמר ר"ש השוחט בלילה ולמחר מצא כתלים מלאים דם כשרה שזינקה וכמדת ר"א ואמר שמואל כותלי בית שחיטה שנינו אי אמרת בשלמא בתחלת שחיטה שפיר אלא אי אמרת בסוף שחיטה ליחוש דלמא בתחלת שחיטה זינקה Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak explained further and said: From where do I say that this is so? It is from the mishna, as we learned that Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of one who slaughters at night and the next day he awoke and found walls full of blood, the slaughter is valid, as it is clear that the blood spurted, and this is in accordance with the rule of Rabbi Eliezer. And Shmuel said with regard to the walls mentioned in the statement of Rabbi Shimon: It is the walls of the place of the slaughter, i.e., the walls of the neck, not the walls of the house, that we learned. Granted, if you say that a convulsion even at the beginning of the act of slaughter is an indication of life, this works out well. But if you say that a convulsion is an indication of life only at the conclusion of the act of slaughter, let us be concerned that perhaps the blood spurted onto the walls of the neck at the beginning of the act of slaughter, and there was no indication of life.

ודלמא שאני זינוק דעדיף The Gemara rejects that proof. But perhaps spurting is different, as it is superior as an indication of life to extending or bending a foreleg, and therefore, although extending or bending a foreleg is a sufficient indicator of life only at the conclusion of the act of slaughter, spurting is a sufficient indicator even at the beginning of the act of slaughter.

ומי עדיף והתנן ר"א אומר דייה אם זינקה קל מדרבן גמליאל ועדיף מדרבנן The Gemara asks: And is spurting superior? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer says it is sufficient if blood spurted from the neck, indicating that spurting of blood is a less substantive indication of life than those indications mentioned in the statement of Rabban Gamliel, who requires that the animal convulse with its foreleg and with its hind leg? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer’s requirement of spurting is less substantive than the requirements of Rabban Gamliel as an indication of life, but superior to the requirement of the Rabbis as an indication of life, where the Rabbis require that the animal convulse either with its foreleg or with its hind leg.

אמר רבינא אמר לי סמא בר חילקאי אקשי בה אבוה דבר אבוברם ואמרי לה אחוה דבר אבוברם ומדרבנן מי עדיף והא תנן וחכמים אומרים עד שתפרכס או ביד או ברגל Ravina said: Samma bar Ḥilkai said to me that the father of bar Abuveram, and some say that it was the brother of bar Abuveram, raises a difficulty: And is blood spurting superior to the requirement of the Rabbis as an indication of life? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: And the Rabbis say: It is permitted only in a case where it convulses with its foreleg or with its hind leg, or in a case where it wags its tail?

רבנן אהייא קיימו אילימא אדר"ג כיון שפירכסה מיבעי ליה Ravina elaborates: To which statement of the tanna’im in the mishna do the Rabbis stand and respond? If we say that they are responding to the statement of Rabban Gamliel, who requires that the animal convulse with its foreleg and with its hind leg, the Rabbis should have said: Once the animal convulsed with its foreleg or with its hind leg or it wagged its tail, indicating that this is sufficient.

אלא פשיטא אדר"א ואי עדיף מאי עד Rather, it is obvious that the Rabbis are responding to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And if Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is superior to that of the Rabbis as an indication of life, what is the meaning of: It is permitted only in a case where it convulses with its foreleg or with its hind leg or it wags its tail? In that case too, the Rabbis should have said: Once the animal convulses with its foreleg or with its hind leg or it wags its tail. Apparently, blood spurting is a less substantive indication of life, and the proof of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak remains valid: If spurting at the beginning of the act of slaughter is a sufficient indication of life to render the slaughter valid, then all the more so, extending and bending a limb are also sufficient indications of life.

רבא אמר פירכוס שאמרו בסוף שחיטה אמר רבא מנא אמינא לה דתניא שור Rava said: The convulsion that the Rabbis said is an indication of life is a convulsion at the conclusion of the act of slaughter. Rava said: From where do I say that this is the case? It is as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “When a bull or a sheep or a goat is born, it shall be seven days under its mother; and from the eighth day and onward it may be accepted for an offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 22:27). The phrase “a bull

(ויקרא כב, כז) או כשב פרט לכלאים או עז פרט לנדמה כי יולד פרט ליוצא דופן שבעת ימים פרט למחוסר זמן תחת אמו פרט ליתום or a sheep” is to the exclusion of an animal born to parents of diverse kinds, which may not be brought as an offering. The phrase “or a goat” is to the exclusion of an animal that resembles another species of animal. “When it is born”; this is to the exclusion of an animal born by caesarean section. “It shall be seven days”; this is to the exclusion of an animal whose time has not yet arrived. “Under its mother”; this is to the exclusion of an animal that is an orphan.

האי יתום ה"ד אילימא דילידתיה אמיה והדר מתה לעולם תיחי ותיזיל אלא דמתה והדר ילידתיה מכי יולד נפקא Rava elaborates: What are the circumstances of this orphan? If we say that its mother gave birth to it and then died, this is unreasonable. Will the mother continue living forever? Rather, perhaps the reference is to a case where the mother died and then gave birth to it. The Gemara rejects that possibility, as the fact that this animal is disqualified from sacrifice is derived from the phrase: “When it is born,” since after the mother’s death the newborn animal can emerge from the womb only by means of caesarean section.

אלא פשיטא זה פירש למיתה וזה פירש לחיים אי אמרת בשלמא בעינן חיותא בסוף לידה היינו דאיצטריך קרא למעוטי אלא אי אמרת לא בעינן חיותא בסוף לידה למה ליה מכי יולד נפקא Rather, it is obvious that the reference is to a case where the mother died at the conclusion of the birth, at which point this mother withdrew for death and that newborn withdrew for life. Granted, if you say that we require life at the conclusion of the birth, that is why a verse was necessary to exclude the orphan. But if you say that we do not require life at the conclusion of the birth, and the verse is excluding only an animal that was born after its mother’s death, why is this verse necessary to exclude it? It can be derived from the phrase: “When it is born.” It may be derived from here that in any situation where the animal must be alive, it must remain alive until the end of the process. That is the case with regard to the slaughter of an animal in danger of imminent death as well. The slaughter is valid only if there is an indication of life at the end of the act of slaughter.

אמר רבא הלכתא כי הא מתניתא בהמה דקה שפשטה ידה ולא החזירה פסולה § The mishna teaches: The slaughter of a small animal in danger of imminent death that during the slaughter extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. Rava says that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion expressed in this baraita: The slaughter of a small animal that extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid.

במה דברים אמורים ביד אבל ברגל בין פשטה ולא כפפה בין כפפה ולא פשטה כשרה בד"א בדקה אבל בגסה בין ביד בין ברגל בין פשטה ולא כפפה בין כפפה ולא פשטה כשרה ועוף אפילו לא רפרף אלא גפו ולא כשכש אלא זנבו הרי זה פירכוס The baraita continues: In what case is this statement said? It is with regard to the foreleg. But with regard to the hind leg, whether the animal extended it and did not restore it to the bent position or the animal bent it but did not extend it, the slaughter is valid. In what case is this statement, about extending the foreleg, said? It is with regard to a small animal. But with regard to a large animal, whether the convulsion involves its foreleg or its hind leg, and whether the animal extended it and did not restore it to the bent position or the animal bent it but did not extend it, the slaughter is valid. And with regard to a bird, even if it fluttered [rifref] only its wing or wagged only its tail, that is a convulsion and an indication of life.

מאי קמ"ל כולהו תננהי בהמה דקה שפשטה ידה ולא החזירה פסולה שאינה אלא הוצאת נפש יד אין רגל לא דקה אין גסה לא עוף איצטריכא ליה דלא תנן: The Gemara asks: What is Rava teaching us in ruling in accordance with the baraita? He is teaching us all of those halakhot we learned in the mishna: The slaughter of a small animal that when being slaughtered extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. It may be inferred from the mishna that with regard to movement of a foreleg alone, yes, it is not an indication of life, but movement of a hind leg, no, it is an indication of life. With regard to a small animal, yes, this is the halakha; with regard to a large animal, no, this is not the halakha, and extending a hind leg does indicate life. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for Rava to teach the halakha in the baraita with regard to a bird, as we did not learn it in the mishna.

מתני׳ השוחט לעובד כוכבי' שחיטתו כשרה ור"א פוסל אמר ר"א אפילו שחטה לאכול לעובד כוכבים מחצר כבד שלה פסולה שסתם מחשבת עובד כוכבים לעבודת כוכבים MISHNA: In the case of a Jew who slaughters the animal of a gentile for a gentile, his slaughter is valid, and Rabbi Eliezer deems it not valid. Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if the Jew slaughtered the animal with the intent to feed the gentile from its diaphragm [meḥatzar kaved], its slaughter is not valid, as the unspecified intent of a gentile is to slaughter the animal for idol worship, and it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.

א"ר יוסי ק"ו הדברים ומה במקום שהמחשבה פוסלת במוקדשין אין הכל הולך אלא אחר העובד מקום שאין מחשבה פוסלת בחולין אינו דין שלא יהא הכל הולך אלא אחר השוחט: Rabbi Yosei says: The matter of the intent of the gentile is irrelevant in this case, as can be derived by means of an a fortiori inference. If in a place where intent while slaughtering the animal invalidates the slaughter, i.e., in sacrificial animals, such as when slaughtering an offering with the intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time, everything follows only the intent of the priest performing the service and not the intent of the owner, then in a place where intent does not invalidate the slaughter, i.e., in non-sacred animals, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?

גמ׳ הני תנאי אית להו דר' אליעזר ברבי יוסי דתניא אמר ר' אליעזר ברבי יוסי שמעתי שהבעלים מפגלין GEMARA: In explanation of the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Eliezer, the Gemara explains: These tanna’im hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: I heard that the owners, and not only the priest, render an offering piggul by means of improper intent. The same is true with regard to non-sacred slaughter, where the owners’ intent for idol worship invalidates the slaughter, even if the slaughterer has no intent for idol worship.

מיהו ת"ק סבר אי שמעיניה דחשיב אין אי לא לא סתם מחשבת עובד כוכבים לעבודת כוכבים לא אמרינן ור"א סבר אע"ג דלא שמעיניה דחשיב סתם מחשבת עובד כוכבים לעבודת כוכבים אמרינן ואתא רבי יוסי למימר אע"ג דשמעיניה דחשיב זה מחשב וזה עובד לא אמרינן But the first tanna holds that if we heard the gentile say that he intends the animal for idol worship, yes, his intent invalidates the slaughter, and if the gentile did not voice his intent before us, his intent does not invalidate the slaughter, as we do not say that the unspecified intent of a gentile is for idol worship. Rabbi Eliezer holds: Although we did not hear the gentile say that he intends the animal for idol worship, the slaughter is not valid, as we say the unspecified intent of a gentile is for idol worship. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say that even though we heard the gentile say that he intends the animal for idol worship, in a case where this owner has intent for idol worship and that other person is performing the slaughter, we do not say that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter.

איכא דאמרי בדשמעיניה דחשיב פליגי ת"ק סבר כי אמרינן זה מחשב וזה עובד הני מילי בפנים אבל בחוץ לא חוץ מפנים There are those who say an alternative explanation of the mishna. It is with regard to a case where we heard the gentile say that he intends the animal for idol worship that the tanna’im disagree. The first tanna holds that when we say in a case where this owner has improper intent and that other person is performing the slaughter that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter, this statement applies only inside the Temple, in the slaughter of offerings. But with regard to non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple, the intent of the owner does not invalidate the slaughter, as with regard to deriving the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple,

לא ילפינן ואתא רבי אליעזר למימר ילפינן חוץ מפנים ואתא רבי יוסי למימר אפילו בפנים נמי זה מחשב וזה עובד לא אמרינן we do not derive in this manner. And Rabbi Eliezer comes to say that we derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple, and therefore the intent of the gentile invalidates non-sacred slaughter. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say that even inside the Temple, in a case where this owner has improper intent and that other person is performing the slaughter, we do not say that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter.

אתמר השוחט את הבהמה לזרוק דמה לעבודת כוכבים ולהקטיר חלבה לעבודת כוכבים רבי יוחנן אמר פסולה ר"ש בן לקיש אמר מותרת § It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to one who slaughtered an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, or to burn its fat for idol worship. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The slaughter is not valid, and benefit from the animal is forbidden. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The slaughter is valid and deriving benefit from the animal is permitted.

רבי יוחנן אמר פסולה מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה וילפינן חוץ מפנים The Gemara elaborates. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The slaughter is not valid and benefit from the animal is forbidden. He holds that one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. If, while slaughtering a sacrificial animal, one intends to perform one of the other sacrificial rites in an improper manner the offering is invalidated. And Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that we derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. Since that intent invalidates the slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple, it invalidates the slaughter of non-sacred animals outside the Temple as well.

ריש לקיש אמר מותרת אין מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה ולא גמרינן חוץ מפנים Reish Lakish says: The slaughter is valid, and deriving benefit from the animal is permitted. He holds that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. Therefore, while slaughtering the animal, only intent to perform the slaughter improperly invalidates the offering, but intent to perform another sacrificial rite improperly does not invalidate the offering. And Reish Lakish holds that we do not derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple.

ואזדו לטעמייהו דאתמר שחטה לשמה לזרוק דמה שלא לשמה רבי יוחנן אמר פסולה ר"ש בן לקיש אמר כשרה And Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish follow their standard line of reasoning, as it was stated: If one slaughtered a sin offering for its own sake, but with intent to sprinkle its blood not for its own sake but for the sake of another type of offering, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the offering is unfit, and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the offering is fit.

רבי יוחנן אמר פסולה מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה וגמרינן ממחשבת פיגול ר"ש בן לקיש אמר כשרה אין מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה ולא גמרינן ממחשבת פיגול The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the offering is unfit. He holds that one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, and the reason is that we derive the halakha of slaughter of a sin offering not for its sake from the halakha of intent for piggul, i.e., performance of one of the sacrificial rites with the intent to sprinkle the blood of the offering beyond its appointed time. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the offering is fit because he holds that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, and the reason is that we do not derive the halakha of any other improper intent from the halakha of intent for piggul.

וצריכא דאי איתמר בהא בהא קאמר ר"ש בן לקיש משום דחוץ מפנים לא ילפינן אבל פנים מפנים אימא מודי ליה לרבי יוחנן The Gemara notes: And it is necessary to state the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in both cases. As, if it were stated only with regard to that case of one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, perhaps one would conclude that it is specifically in that case that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish states his opinion that the slaughter is valid, due to the fact that we do not derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. But in the case of one who slaughters an offering for the sake of another offering, where we would be deriving the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple from the halakhot of another case of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple, say that Reish Lakish concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan that the offering is unfit.

ואי אתמר בהך בההיא קאמר רבי יוחנן אבל בהא אימא מודי ליה לר"ש בן לקיש צריכא And if their dispute was stated with regard to this case of one who slaughters an offering for the sake of another offering, perhaps one would conclude that it is specifically in this case that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the offering is unfit, because he holds that one derives the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple from the halakhot of another case of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. But in that case of one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, say that Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish that the offering is fit due to the fact that the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple are not derived from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. Therefore, it is necessary to state the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in both cases.

מתיב רב ששת א"ר יוסי ק"ו הדברים ומה במקום שמחשבה פוסלת במוקדשין אין הכל הולך אלא אחר העובד מקום שאין מחשבה פוסלת בחולין אינו דין שלא יהא הכל הולך אלא אחר השוחט Rav Sheshet raises an objection to both Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish from the statement in the mishna with regard to one who slaughters for a gentile when the intent of the gentile is for idol worship. Rabbi Yosei says: The matter of the intent of the gentile is irrelevant in this case as can be derived by means of an a fortiori inference. If in a place where intent while slaughtering the animal invalidates the slaughter, i.e., in sacrificial animals, such as when slaughtering an offering with the intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time, everything follows only the intent of the priest performing the service and not the intent of the owner, then in a place where intent does not invalidate the slaughter, i.e., in non-sacred animals, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?

מאי אין מחשבה פוסלת בחולין אילימא דלא פסלה כלל אלא זביחה דעבודת כוכבים דמיתסרא היכי משכחת לה Rav Sheshet elaborates: What is the meaning of: Intent does not invalidate the slaughter in non-sacred animals? If we say that it means that intent does not invalidate the slaughter of non-sacred animals at all, but then how can you find a case of slaughter with intent for idol worship where the animal is forbidden?

אלא פשיטא מעבודה לעבודה וה"ק ומה במקום שמחשבה פוסלת במוקדשין מעבודה לעבודה אין הכל הולך אלא אחר העובד מקום שאין מחשבה פוסלת בחולין מעבודה לעבודה אלא באותה עבודה אינו דין שלא יהא הכל הולך אלא אחר השוחט Rather, it is obvious that the meaning of that phrase in the statement of Rabbi Yosei is that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, and this is what Rabbi Yosei is saying: If in a place where intent invalidates, i.e., in sacrificial animals, from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, everything follows only the intent of the one performing the slaughter, and the intent of the owners is irrelevant, in a place where intent does not invalidate, i.e., in non-sacred animals, from one rite to another rite but it does so only within the same rite, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?

פנים קשיא לר"ש בן לקיש חוץ קשיא לרבי יוחנן According to this understanding of the contention of Rabbi Yosei in the mishna, the case of the slaughter of a sacrificial animal inside the Temple is difficult for Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, as contrary to his opinion, Rabbi Yosei says that in that case one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. The case of slaughter of a non-sacred animal outside the Temple is difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan, as contrary to his opinion, Rabbi Yosei says that in that case one does not transfer intent from one rite to another rite.

בשלמא פנים לר"ש בן לקיש לא קשיא הא מקמי דשמעה מרבי יוחנן הא לבתר דשמעה מרבי יוחנן אלא חוץ קשיא לרבי יוחנן Rav Sheshet continues: Granted, the case of inside the Temple is not difficult for Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, because one can explain that he stated this statement that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite before he heard the mishna from Rabbi Yoḥanan, his teacher, and he stated that one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite after he heard the mishna from Rabbi Yoḥanan. His dispute with Rabbi Yoḥanan is limited to transfer of intent for idol worship from rite to rite. But the case of slaughter of a non-sacred animal outside the Temple is difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan.

הוא מותיב לה והוא מפרק לה בארבע עבודות וה"ק ומה במקום שמחשבה פוסלת במוקדשין בארבע עבודות אין הכל הולך אלא אחר העובד Rav Sheshet raises the objection, and he resolves it. That which Rabbi Yosei said, that intent inside the Temple disqualifies the slaughter of a sacrificial animal but intent outside the Temple does not disqualify the slaughter of a non-sacred animal, is unrelated to transfer of intent from one rite to another. Rather, Rabbi Yosei is referring to a case where one performed any of the four sacrificial rites with improper intent, e.g., to eat the offering beyond its appointed time. And this is what Rabbi Yosei is saying: If in a place where intent while slaughtering the animal invalidates the slaughter in sacrificial animals, if that intent was during performance of any of the four sacrificial rites, i.e., slaughter, receiving the blood, conveying the blood to the altar, and sprinkling the blood on the altar, everything follows only the intent of the priest performing the service and not the intent of the owner,

מקום שאין מחשבה פוסלת בחולין אלא בשתי עבודות אינו דין שלא יהא הכל הולך אלא אחר השוחט then in a place where intent invalidates the slaughter in non-sacred animals slaughtered with intent for idol worship during performance of only two sacrificial rites, slaughter and sprinkling the blood, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?

תניא כוותיה דרבי יוחנן השוחט את הבהמה לזרוק דמה לעבודת כוכבים ולהקטיר חלבה לעבודת כוכבים הרי אלו זבחי מתים שחטה ואח"כ חישב עליה זה היה מעשה בקיסרי ולא אמרו בה לא איסור ולא היתר It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship or to burn its fat for idol worship, the status of these animals is that of offerings to the dead, i.e., to idols, and the slaughter is not valid. If one slaughtered the animal and thereafter intended in its regard to sprinkle its blood or burn its fats for idol worship, that was the incident in Caesarea, and the Sages did not say anything with regard to the animal, neither prohibition nor permission.

אמר רב חסדא לא אמרו בה איסור משום כבודן דרבנן לא היתר משום כבודו דרבי אליעזר Rav Ḥisda says in explanation of the conduct of the Sages that they did not say prohibition, due to the honor of the Rabbis in the mishna, who hold that the unspecified intent of a gentile, and presumably likewise of a Jew who worships idols, is not presumed to be directed to idol worship, and therefore his slaughter is valid. Nor did the Sages say permission, due to the honor of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that the unspecified intent of a gentile, and presumably likewise of a Jew who worships idols, is presumed to be directed to idol worship.

ממאי דלמא עד כאן לא קאמרי רבנן התם אלא דלא שמענא דחשיב אבל הכא דשמענא דחשיב הוכיח סופו על תחלתו The Gemara asks: From where is that conclusion drawn? Perhaps the Rabbis say that the slaughter is permitted only there in the mishna, because we did not hear explicitly that the gentile intends the slaughter for idol worship. But here in the case in the baraita, where we hear thereafter that he intends to sprinkle the blood or burn the fats for idol worship, perhaps his ultimate statement proves the nature of his original intent while performing the slaughter.

אי נמי ע"כ לא קאמר ר"א התם אלא גבי עובד כוכבים דסתם מחשבת עובד כוכבים לעבודת כוכבים אבל ישראל הוכיח סופו על תחלתו לא אמרינן Alternatively, perhaps when Rabbi Eliezer states there in the mishna that slaughter performed on behalf of a gentile is not valid, this applies only with regard to an animal that is owned by a gentile, as the unspecified intent of a gentile is directed to idol worship. But in the case in the baraita where the animal belongs to a Jew, we do not say that his ultimate statement proves the nature of his original intent.

אלא אמר רב שיזבי לא אמרו בה היתר משום כבודו דרשב"ג הי רשב"ג Rather, Rav Sheizevi said that the Sages did not state permission with regard to the animal in the baraita due to the honor of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds that one’s ultimate actions prove the nature of his original intent. The Gemara asks: Which statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel indicates that this is his opinion?

אילימא רשב"ג דגיטין דתנן הבריא שאמר כתבו גט לאשתי רצה לשחק בה If we say that the reference is to the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with regard to bills of divorce, this is difficult. As we learned in a mishna (Gittin 66a) that if a dying man said to the people present: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, those people should write and deliver the bill of divorce to his wife. Although the delivery was not included in his command, that is clearly his intent. But a healthy man who says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, but did not say: Deliver it to her, presumably sought to mock her and not to designate his listeners as agents of delivery.

ומעשה בבריא שאמר כתבו גט לאשתי ועלה לגג ונפל ומת אמר רשב"ג אם מעצמו נפל ה"ז גט ואם הרוח דחתו אינו גט The mishna continues: And there was an incident involving a healthy man who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, and then ascended to the roof and fell, and died. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If he fell at his own initiative, taking his own life, it is a valid bill of divorce, as it is clear that he anticipated his death, thereby rendering his halakhic status like that of a dying man. But if the wind forced him to fall and he died, it is not a valid bill of divorce, as there was no clear intent to give her the bill of divorce.

והוינן בה מעשה לסתור And we discussed the mishna: Did the tanna cite an incident to contradict that which was stated previously in the mishna? The tanna states unequivocally that when a healthy man says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, the bill of divorce is not valid. The tanna then cites an incident indicating that under certain circumstances, when a healthy man says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, the bill of divorce is valid.

חסורי מיחסרא והכי קתני אם הוכיח סופו על תחלתו ה"ז גט ומעשה נמי בבריא שאמר כתבו גט לאשתי ועלה לגג ונפל ומת אמר רשב"ג אם מעצמו נפל ה"ז גט ואם הרוח דחתו אינו גט The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: The healthy man who says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, but did not say: Deliver it to her, presumably sought to mock her. But if his ultimate actions prove the nature of his initial intent, that he seeks to give the bill of divorce because he is about to die, it is a valid bill of divorce. And there was an incident involving a healthy man who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, and then ascended to the roof and fell, and died. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If he fell at his own initiative, it is a valid bill of divorce, but if the wind forced him to fall, it is not a valid bill of divorce.

ודלמא שאני התם דקאמר כתבו The Gemara explains why this is not a proof: But perhaps the case cited there is different, as the husband initially says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, indicating that he originally intended to fall from the roof. By contrast, in the case of slaughter, there is no indication of his original intent.

אלא אמר רבינא משום כבודו דרשב"ג דהכא דתניא הכותב נכסיו לאחרים והיו בהן עבדים ואמר הלה אי אפשי בהן אם היה רבו שני כהן הרי אלו אוכלין בתרומה רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר כיון שאמר הלה אי אפשי בהן כבר זכו בהן יורשין Rather, Ravina said that the Sages did not state permission in the incident in Caesarea with regard to the animal due to the honor of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, to avoid contradicting the opinion that is cited here, as it is taught in a baraita: In a case of a person on his deathbed who wrote a document transferring his property to others, and there were slaves among his property, and that intended recipient says: I do not want to assume ownership of the slaves, if their second master, the intended recipient, was a priest, these slaves may partake of teruma, and his protest is ignored. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Once that intended recipient says: I do not want to assume ownership of the slaves, heirs of the original owner already acquired them.

והוינן בה לת"ק אפילו עומד וצווח And we discussed the baraita: And according to the first tanna, does the intended recipient acquire the slaves even if he stands and shouts in protest that he does not want to assume ownership of the slaves? That is not reasonable.

אמר רבה ואיתימא רבי יוחנן בצווח מעיקרא דכ"ע לא פליגי דלא קנה בשותק ובסוף צווח דכ"ע לא פליגי דקנה Rabba said, and some say it was Rabbi Yoḥanan who said: In a case where he shouts in protest at the outset, while the owner is giving him the gift, everyone agrees that he did not acquire the slaves. In a case where he was silent at that moment and ultimately shouted his protest at a later opportunity, everyone agrees that he acquired the slaves.

כי פליגי שזיכה לו ע"י אחר ושתק ולבסוף צווח ת"ק סבר מדשתיק קננהו והאי דקא צווח מיהדר קא הדר ביה When they disagree it is in a case where the owner transferred ownership of the slaves to him through another person, and at that point the recipient was silent, and ultimately, when he actually received the slaves, he shouted in protest. The first tanna holds: Since he was initially silent, he acquired the slaves, and the fact that he is ultimately shouting indicates that he is retracting his initial acceptance of the gift. That retraction is ineffective, as acquisitions cannot be nullified in that manner.

ורשב"ג סבר הוכיח סופו על תחילתו והא דלא צווח מעיקרא סבר כי לא אתי לידיה אמאי אצווח And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: His ultimate actions prove the nature of his original intent. He never wanted the slaves and always intended to avoid assuming ownership of them. And the fact that he did not shout initially is because he thought: As the situation is that they did not yet enter my possession, why would I shout?

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי יוסי § The Gemara resumes discussion of the dispute in the mishna where Rabbi Yosei says that when a Jew slaughters an animal on behalf of a gentile, even if it is known that the intent of the gentile is for idol worship, the slaughter is valid, as it is only the intent of the slaughterer that is relevant. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

הנהו טייעי דאתו לציקוניא יהיב דיכרי לטבחי ישראל אמרו להו דמא ותרבא לדידן משכא ובישרא לדידכו שלחה רב טובי בר רב מתנה לקמיה דרב יוסף כי האי גוונא מאי שלח ליה הכי א"ר יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי יוסי The Gemara relates: There were these Arabs who came to Tzikuneya, and they gave rams to Jewish slaughterers. The Arabs said to them: The blood and the fat are for us, for use in our idol worship, and the hide and the flesh are for you. Rav Tuvi bar Rav Mattana sent a question to be asked before Rav Yosef: In a case like this, what is the halakha? Rav Yosef sent to him: This is what Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and it is the intent of the slaughterer and not the intent of the owner that determines the validity of the slaughter.

א"ל רב אחא בריה דרב אויא לרב אשי לר"א יהיב ליה זוזא לטבח ישראל מאי אמר ליה חזינן אי איניש אלמא הוא דלא מצי מדחי ליה אסור ואי לא א"ל רישיך והר: Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the mishna, that if a Jew slaughters an animal on behalf of a gentile the slaughter is not valid, if the gentile gave a dinar to a Jewish slaughterer in order to purchase a small amount of the meat, what is the halakha? Does that small amount invalidate the entire slaughter? Rav Ashi said to him: We examine the situation. If this gentile is a violent man, and the Jew is unable to repudiate his offer and tell him to take his money, the entire animal is forbidden, because the slaughter was partially on behalf of the gentile. And if the gentile is not violent, the Jew can say to him: Go and arrange a collision between your head and a mountain, as I will not slaughter an animal on your behalf.

מתני׳ השוחט לשם הרים לשם גבעות לשם ימים לשם נהרות לשם מדברות שחיטתו פסולה MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters an animal for the sake of, i.e., to worship, mountains, for the sake of hills, for the sake of seas, for the sake of rivers, or for the sake of wildernesses, his slaughter is not valid.